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ABSTRACT  
Hannah Arendt distinguishes between two different practices of freedom whose origins 
are rooted into two historical human experiences: political freedom/action and 
philosophical freedom/free will.  She argues that the two experiences were different as 
concerns the origin, the location and the conditions of each. Freedom of the will, or 
philosophical freedom, is relevant only in solitude while political freedom is relevant to 
people living together in political communities. Arendt also claims that the freedom of 
the will is the origin of the ideal of sovereignty which constitutes its meaning in 
commanding and demanding obedience. Hence, the free will realizes its freedom at the 
expense of oppressing one’s self and oppressing others. In addition to presenting the 
Arendtian accounts on the two types of freedom, I shall argue that Arendt’s notion of new 
beginnings is an attempt to transform the faculty of will from a faculty which realizes 
itself in commanding, either itself or others, to a faculty that realizes itself in initiating 
new beginnings with others in the public realm.  
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I INTRODUCTION  
In The Life of the Mind, Hannah Arendt concludes that human beings experience two 
types of freedom, namely, political freedom and philosophical freedom. Through a 
genealogical and historical account of freedom and free will, she infers that both types 
are completely distinct in their origin, nature, and appearance. The most essential feature 
that renders them different is the multiplicity of political freedom versus singularity in 
philosophical freedom. In other words, political freedom is a phenomenon of a multitude 
acting together, while philosophical freedom is a phenomenon of individual free will.
1
  
It is quite paradoxical that both types of freedom, the political and the 
philosophical, originally came from outside the philosophical tradition. Political freedom, 
according to Arendt, was first experienced as human reality in the Greek polis; however, 
Greek philosophy was the reversal of the reality of the polis, not its representation. 
Philosophical freedom was born in the religious and Stoic experiences of the first century 
A.D. Later in the Middle Ages, the problem of freedom was discussed in theology, which 
transferred the problem to the discipline of philosophy. Therefore, philosophy had to deal 
with a double difficulty: that of theology and that stemming from the perplexing problem 
itself. This is why the problem of freedom “has been the last of the time-honored great 
metaphysical questions…to become a topic of philosophic inquiry at all,”2 in comparison 
to eternity, time, being, and so forth. 
                                                 
1
 We will see later how plurality is the human condition of action. Arendt, The Human Condition, 15. Also 
Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 199.  
2
Arendt, “What is Freedom?,” 145. 
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In this thesis, I shall explain how Arendt came to the two conclusions regarding 
her unique understanding of the concept of freedom. The first conclusion argues that 
there are two human experiences of freedom that existed in different conditions. The 
second conclusion states that these two types of freedom are distinct.
3
 Two main aspects 
clarify this distinction. The first concerns their separate origin in human experience, 
which brought each of them into existence. The second involves the conditions that 
specify and qualify both experiences.  
Arendt explains that while political freedom originates in the ancient Greek polis 
and finds its manifestation in praxis, philosophical freedom has a twofold origin in the 
religious experience of Christianity and (even earlier) in the philosophical experience of 
stoicism. Both of these experiences led to the discovery of the inner man, where the will 
dwells.
4
 Moreover, the conditions of political freedom, on the one hand, and the 
conditions of philosophical freedom on the other hand are completely different. Political 
freedom is only possible under the condition of plurality, where fellow men found a 
body-politic regulated by norms and laws and create organized public spaces, where they 
can act together. Philosophical freedom, by contrast, is only possible on the condition of 
solitude. Hence, no organized public space is required in order to experience internal or 
philosophical freedom, and no fellows are needed.
5
  
                                                 
3
 I write “unique” understanding because Arendt was the first thinker to point out that there is such 
difference. Only, Montesquieu, as Arendt also remarked, has also noticed the difference. This remark will 
be explained later in the section of relation.  
4
 Arendt discusses the origin of political freedom in her book: The Human Condition in while she discusses 
the origin of philosophical freedom in her book: The Life of the Mind/willing.  
5
 Arendt, The Life of the Mind/ Willing, 199.  
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Arendt’s inference that the two types of freedom are distinct stimulates us to ask 
whether the two types relate to each other, or whether they are entirely unrelated. Arendt 
does not address the question of their relation explicitly; however, she points out that the 
two kinds of freedom are opposed. In other words, the existence of one necessarily 
nullifies the existence of the other. To be more specific, Arendt says that we normally 
experience philosophical freedom through our faculty of will, or what she calls “I-will.” 
In contrast, when we experience political freedom, we experience our actual abilities or 
what she calls “I-can.” Because the I-will constitutes itself in commands, philosophical 
freedom ends up in domination, while political freedom constitutes itself in the I-can; 
thus, it ends up in cooperation with others because no one is capable by himself. The 
latter is a completely external phenomenon, which takes place between equal agents that 
are acting together and are not commanding each other, i.e. the phenomenon is an 
intersubjective one. Thus, political freedom has no internal existence. We will see later 
how the I-will, which is a completely internal phenomenon, crosses its boundaries to 
realize itself as a commanding faculty demanding complete obedience and submission 
from others.
6
 This is what Arendt claims to be the origin of the problem of sovereignty. 
The paradoxical result is that the mental faculty which we habitually consider to be the 
faculty of the very experience of human freedom, ends in the utter dominance of one will 
over the wills of others, who end up by being completely deprived of their freedom. From 
this perspective, the will, paradoxically enough, is an organ for domination when it 
extends itself to the public realm.  
                                                 
6
 In the 4
th
 section: relation. 
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In this thesis, in addition to explaining and summarizing the Arendtian theory of 
the two freedoms, I claim that Arendt seeks to transform the faculty of will from a faculty 
that realizes itself in commanding and obeying, both internally and externally, to a 
faculty that realizes itself in the act of beginning. Arendt does not state explicitly that she 
is seeking a transformation of the faculty of will. However, I will argue that since she 
sees no compromise between the domination-seeking faculty and freedom, she wants to 
abolish the domination of the faculty of will and to direct the will towards the outer 
world, where it experiences the freedom of action in inciting a beginning with others. 
How does Arendt transform the faculty of will from an organ of domination into 
an organ of freedom? I shall explore the subject by following the Arendtian argument 
through three main phases. First, I will explain what she means by political and 
philosophical freedom. Second, I will address the difference between the two types and 
the relationship between them. Third, I will arrive at the crux of the thesis, which is 
arguing why Arendt transformed the faculty of will into a faculty of beginning. 
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II POLITICAL FREEDOM  
Arendt argues that the Greeks, shaped by their life in the polis, experienced a reality of 
freedom that has no connection to the Will.
7
 This claim is strange since we, in our 
modern times, tend to think that freedom is an expression of the Will. For us, the Will is 
the mainspring of action, which bears responsibility for experiencing ourselves as free 
agents.
8
 Bearing in mind this modern understanding of relating action to the will, 
Arendt’s analysis that Greeks experienced freedom in the polis, and at the same time, this 
experience is not an expression of the faculty of Will would be problematic. If the Greeks 
were unaware of the faculty of will, as Arendt maintains, then freedom for them is not a 
phenomenon of I-will.
9
 Hence, the question guiding the argument is: what is freedom an 
expression of? Moreover, if the Greeks did not discover the faculty of the Will, how can 
the faculty of choice, which was already discussed by Aristotle, be understood as 
different from the faculty of Will?
 10
  
To address this issue, I shall explain how Arendt describes and depicts the 
Greek’s polis, how Greeks interpreted human activity as Arendt analyzes and why they 
did not discover the faculty of Will. In the following three subsections, I shall explain: 
first, Vita Activa and the Human Condition; second, the Political, Action and Freedom; 
and third, Time and the Faculty of Choice. 
                                                 
7
 Arendt’s method in understanding freedom is to look into Greek experience as an exemplary and basic 
human experience.  
8
 Arendt, The Life of the Mind/ Willing, 57.  
9
 Arendt coins the terms: I-will and I-can to refer to the relation of the subject to philosophical and political 
freedom consequently. I-can indicates the subject’s ability to act in the political realm, while I-will 
indicates subject’s internal willing of a thing that might be experienced inside only or might project 
externally as well.  
10
 Arendt, The Life of the Mind/ Willing, 55-63. In the discussion of the faculty of choice in Aristotle, 
Arendt refers to De Anima, Nichomachean Ethics and Eudemien Ethics. 
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II. A. Vita Activa and the Human Condition 
II. A. 1. The Three Categories of Human Activity  
Arendt argues that the Greeks experienced living through two realms only: the private 
realm or household, and the public realm or polis. This sharp distinction of life into two 
realms determined how Ancient Greeks interpreted and differentiated their activities, and 
where they assigned the location of each. Human activities could be one of three main 
types. First: activities subsumed under labor, which are the activities related to the 
necessities of the body and the sustenance of life. Second: activities subsumed under 
work, which are the activities related to making useful things. Third: activities subsumed 
under action, which are the activities related to interacting with ones’ fellow men in the 
polis by words and by deeds.
11
   
Arendt asserts that the Greek life in the polis was characterized by assigning 
every activity to its proper location. Labor, which corresponds to the necessities of life, 
was kept inside the walls of the household (the private space) and was assigned mainly to 
slaves. Work, which corresponds to making and to fabrication, was done in private spaces 
by craftsmen, yet exhibited in public space, in the polis. Action, which corresponds to 
interaction with ones’ free and equal fellows, was the political activity par excellence and 
was the prerogative of freemen or citizens.
12
 These three categories were mentioned by 
Aristotle in the Politics, where he states: “Life as a whole is divided …into occupation 
                                                 
11
 Arendt, The Human Condition, 12, 28. 
12
 Ibid., 7-30.  
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and leisure… and of matters involving action some are directed toward necessary and 
useful things, others toward noble things.”13  
Taking into consideration that by the term “action” in this passage Aristotle 
denotes the human activity in general, it is conspicuous that he almost puts both the 
categories of useful and necessary things on one side and noble things on the other.
14
 In 
other words, Aristotle puts the slave, who bears the burden of maintaining life’s 
necessities, and the craftsman, who makes useful things and artifacts, in close proximity. 
However, he places the one who does “noble things” in a higher rank. He even holds that 
the purpose of keeping the necessary and the useful is to facilitate and to make the life of 
who does noble things possible. As he puts it: “…necessary and useful things [are taken 
care of by slaves and craftsmen] for the sake of noble things.”15 
The Aristotelian hierarchy denotes that the basic principle of division and ranking 
is whether there is an equal choice for either doing or not-doing a particular activity. It is 
recognizable that for the activities dictated by life necessities, there is no other choice but 
to do them to ensure survival. Hence, the one who is devoted to this activity solely is 
unfree and the activity itself is not noble.
16
 Moreover, the ranking of activities implies an 
inescapable inequality between the individuals performing the activities. Those who are 
busy satisfying the needs of the necessary and the making of the useful things are unequal 
to those who are capable of devoting their lives to doing noble things. The ranking of the 
three categories of human activities in general, and the highest rank given to the “noble 
                                                 
13
 Aristotle, Politics, 1333a30. 
14
 This is not the position of Arendt. Arendt distinguishes sharply between the three types of activities and 
deals with them separately.  
15
 Aristotle, Politics, 1333a35.  
16
 This is in the Aristotelian sense. 
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things,” in particular, is what gave rise to the Aristotle’s conception of Bios Politikos, 
which I shall discuss in the following sub-section.  
 
II. A. 2. The Aristotelian Bios Politikos and Vita Activa 
With the phrase Bios Politikos, Aristotle designates three main activities that could be 
practiced freely. The activities of the Bios Politikos are all concerned solely with “the 
beautiful.” A free man could adopt one of the three ways of life:  
the life of enjoying bodily pleasures in which the beautiful, as it is given, is 
consumed; the life devoted to the matters of the polis, in which excellence 
produces beautiful deeds; and the life of the philosopher devoted to inquiry into, 
and contemplation of, things eternal, whose everlasting beauty can neither be 
brought about through the producing interference of man nor be changed through 
his consumption of them.
17
 
 
In this passage, Aristotle considers the way of life of the philosopher as of the same rank 
as the way of life of the one who enjoys bodily pleasures and the one who is devoted to 
matters of the polis even though “contemplation,” which is the main thing the 
philosopher is busy with, does not seem to be an activity. 
There are two points that could be inferred from the Aristotelian’s Bios Politikos. 
First, the three activities are activities of free men in the polis or the public realm. 
Second, Bios Politikos (or the life devoted to noble things), unlike the activities devoted 
to the necessary and useful things, could be done or left undone without coercion. Thus, 
the three activities all count for free acts. Praxis (action) and lexis (speech) are means of 
action in the Aristotelian categories of Bios Politikos. And, hence, action and speech are 
                                                 
17
 Arendt, The Human Condition, 13. Arendt did not refer to text-passage by Aristotle for this paraphrase 
by her.  
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of the same rank for the Greeks. Both were correlated with the free way of life that 
slaves, women, and craftsmen were deprived of in order to enable the free life of who has 
the potential to deal with the beautiful.  
Bios Politikos was later translated in the Middle Ages as Vita Activa. Although it 
kept “its original meaning: a life devoted to public-political matters”18 in Augustine’s 
philosophy, it lost the Greek meaning in the late Middle Ages, at the exact moment when 
“the original Greek understanding of politics had been lost.”19 Even later in the Middle 
Ages, in the time of Thomas Aquinas, a pivotal inclusion and exclusion in the term took 
place. Activities related to the necessary and the useful were included under the Vita 
Activa, while contemplation (the philosopher’s peculiar way of life) was excluded from 
the Vita Activa and it was given a special term of its own: Vita Contemplativa. Indeed, 
Arendt points out that Vita Activa is synonymous, not with the Bios Politikos, but with 
the Greek a-skholia (unquiet), which denoted all the ways of “noisy” life that absolutely 
contradicted the quiet way of life of the philosopher (skhole).
20
  
In fact, Hannah Arendt builds her concept of Vita Activa on the logical broad 
division of human activities, which perfectly matches the conceptualization of the late 
Middle Ages, as well. Additionally, she develops and refines the concept by correlating 
each activity with the “basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to 
man.”21 According to Arendt, Vita Activa is divided into three types: labor which relates 
to life, work which relates to world, and action which relates to plurality. 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., 12. 
19
 Ibid., 23.  
20
 Ibid., 15.  
21
 Ibid., 7.  
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The Arendtian typology is quite different form the Aristotelian typology. Aristotle 
does not create sharp distinctions between labor and work; however, Arendt does create a 
very sharp distinction between these two categories. The basis of Aristotle’s typology is 
the noble (beautiful) on the one hand versus the non-noble (useful and necessary) on the 
other hand. The basis of Arendt’s typology is the human condition by which life on earth 
has been given to man. Since Arendt identifies three human conditions for the human 
existence on earth: life, world and plurality, there must be three human activities 
correlating with the three human conditions. Arendt explains that:  
Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human 
body…the human condition of labor is life itself. Work is the activity which 
corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence …work provides an 
“artificial” world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings. 
Within its borders each individual life is housed, while this world itself is meant 
to outlast and transcend them all. The human condition of work is worldliness. 
Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the 
intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of 
plurality.
22
 
 
Arendt also incorporates the Ancient Greeks’ meanings into her concept of action in 
particular, and into her concept of Vita Activa more generally. For the Ancient Greeks as 
well as for Arendt, labor which is entangled with cyclical and never-ending bodily needs 
and work which is busy with fabrication and making artifacts, are not activities that 
realize human freedom. The only activity that does realize freedom is the human activity 
of Action, which is mainly conditioned by plurality. Neither labor nor work requires the 
company of others. They might need to be facilitated by cooperation or by organization, 
                                                 
22
 Ibid.  
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but they are certainly not conditioned by continuous interaction with equal peers. Only 
action involves human-to-human interaction without a medium in between. 
The Arendtian theory of Vita Activa is very well received by the contemporary 
political theorists; however, her trilogy: labor, work and action was criticized and debated 
by scholars. For instance, Shiraz Dossa considers the order of the activities as quite 
arbitrary:  
The fundamental activities in the vita activa… are not related to each other in any 
particular order of priority intrinsic to the vita activa itself. The order of 
arrangement and the importance assigned to each activity depends wholly on the 
judgement of the theorist assessing the vita activa.
23
 
 
Although Dossa’s criticism is considerable, I disagree with him on his judgment that 
Arendt is trying to put activities into an order or a hierarchy. In my opinion, Arendt’s 
main concern is to locate activities, not to order them as the Aristotelian perspective 
suggests. Her method in determining these activities is mainly logical and descriptive.
24
 
We can easily agree with her that an artisan, for instance, finishes his/her craft in 
isolation and exhibits it in the public realm. Similarly, we can agree with her that the 
work of building a house has a certain beginning and a predictable end; the activity of 
eating to maintain our bodies has no end until the moment of our death. Selya Benhabib 
makes the same remark about Arendt’s concern with the location of human activities. 
Benhabib also argues that “each type of human activity has a proper ‘place’ in which it 
can be carried out. Labor, she [Arendt] claims, does not belong in the public realm, 
                                                 
23
 Dossa, The Public Realm and the Public Self, 51. 
24
 Some literature studies Arendt as a phenomenologist, such as Moran, "Hannah Arendt: the 
phenomenology of the public sphere." and Marder, “Natality, Event, Revolution: The Political 
Phenomenology of Hannah Arendt.”  
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whereas work, although often carried out in solitude, must display its product in 
public.”25  
Benhabib, admits that the sharp distinction between the three types of activities is 
quite problematic. She even cites scholars who “have sought to show that her art of 
making distinctions often obscured rather than illuminated the phenomena at hand.”26 In 
an attempt to solve the problem, Benhabib suggests that this criticism of Arendt does not 
take into account the more fundamental level that offers a basis for Arendt’s distinction, 
which is her philosophical methodology of “phenomenological essentialism.”27 Benhabib 
continues to clarify that this method leads usually to conflation between conceptual 
distinctions and ontological analyses on one hand and social process and historical 
descriptions on the other hand.
28
 According to Benhabib’s suggestion, the problematic 
dimension of Arendt’s theory of Vita Activa is not because of her conceptual sharp 
distinction of the three activities, but the problem arises from our confusion regarding the 
identification of the level on which Arendt is operating on.
29
  
Nevertheless, one could criticize Arendt easily by saying that the distinctions 
simplify the human activity, which might tempt the reader to reduce every particular 
activity into one single type: labor, work or action. Benhabib points out that this remark 
has been made as a standard objection by scholars, who claim that “any complex human 
activity, from factory work, to writing a book, to making a meal, cannot simply be seen 
                                                 
25
 Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, 124. 
26
 Ibid., 123. Benhabib mentiones Hannah Pitkin, Jurgen Habermas, and Richard Bernstein.  
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Ibid., 124.  
29
 Ibid.  
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as an exemplar of a single action type.”30 Benhabib continues to back up this objection by 
a number of examples that illustrate how complex the human activities are and how 
impossible it is to reduce every human particular activity into a single type of activity. 
She illustrates:  
Industrial factory work, for example, is not just labor…depending on the nature of 
the social relations of power on the shop floor, and between union and 
management, there are usually complex dimensions of social interaction involved. 
By building ten rather than fifteen chips per hour, workers may be engaging in a 
slowdown of production. Their activity in this case would not be merely…labor; 
it would also be political activity. Equally, writing a poem may appear as a case 
of pure work in Arendtian terms…but if you are writing a poem as your weekly 
addition to a comic strip that you despise, far from being satisfying work, this 
activity may bear all the marks of drudgery alienated, industrial wage labor. 
Finally, making a meal, the quintessential example of the repetitive, ephemeral 
labor that serves the needs of the body in Arendt’s view, may be an expressive act 
for a gourmet chef, just as it may be an act of love among two or more 
individuals.
31
 
 
I argue that this objection, while obvious and agreeable, is based on mixing the concept 
of the type or the category with the concept of the particular or the real. The three types 
of Vita Activa are categories, yet they are not real particulars. In other words, the three 
types are analytical, not substantial. If the three types were real, there will be no need for 
analyzing or classifying the human activities; neither there will be a justification for 
Arendt’s main question of the human condition, which is to think what we are doing. 
Based on this remark of the difference between the type and the particular, every 
particular activity done in our very complex social and political context, such as writing a 
book or making a meal, could not be wholly subsumed under one single category or type 
of Vita Activa.  
                                                 
30
 Ibid, 131.  
31
 Ibid., 131.  
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In everyday life, we do not normally go straightforward in a linear way from 
doing one type of activity into another type; this is very obvious. However, Arendt’s 
typology allows us to be aware that there are up to three distinct types of activity 
involved in every particular activity. I believe that accepting the typology of Vita Activa 
and being aware of the three types involved explains and illuminates the complexity of 
the phenomenon at hand; additionally, it helps us understand what we are doing, which is 
the main concern of Arendt in the Human Condition. 
Moreover, the correspondence of labor, work and action to the three dimensions 
of human existence, which Arendt calls “conditions,” might help human beings not to 
reduce their complex human existence into one dimension. For reducing one’s existence 
into a single type of existence would have consequences in the form of losing the 
meaning of one’s life, doing injustice to other people, or taking advantage of them. For 
example, an individual who attempts to avoid labor and try to devote his life to action 
entirely would turn into a parasite who lives at the expense of taking advantage of 
someone else who is doing for him his labor and work. Similarly, an individual who is 
forced to devote his/her life to labor only would turn into a means of sustenance of the 
life of another group of people who might be devoted to either work and/or action. On a 
contemporary societal level, taking Vita Activa as a pivotal concept in social justice 
policies would help making sure that every individual/class/group in the society becomes 
involved to some extent in the three activities, so his/her/its existence would not be 
20 
 
 
 
 
reduced into one aspect and would not be deprived from the complexity and the meaning 
of human existence.
32
 
 
II. A. 3. The Life and the World 
Life is the human condition of labor, and plurality is the human condition of action, as 
Arendt states.
33
 But people would not be able to live together in plurality unless they first 
overcome the state of living amid nature. People could not found a body-politic according 
to the principle of action while they are a part of nature, whose necessities deprive people 
of their capacity to be free. People must distinguish themselves from mere life or nature 
by making a world of their own; a world that is a product of their fabrication and which 
can hold the prints of their existence or Dasein: of “being-there at a certain locality in 
space and time,” in Heidegerian terms.34 The world is the man-made home amid the 
wilderness of nature which is a home for the animal existence, but is not a home for 
human existence. The things that the human beings fabricate in order to make earth a 
                                                 
32
 While I was writing this part, I was following up the famine of Madaya, a syrian city under siege amid 
the Syrian civil war. I contemplated the phenomenon from the perspective of Vita Activa and found that 
while people in this small city are starving to death, i.e. lacking the human condition of labor; the main 
reason which have lead into famine was not that they lacked food for the sustenance of their bodies. 
However, the main reason was that there are two groups of people who are not acting together in order to 
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home for themselves are what ensures “stability and solidity without which it could not 
be relied upon to house the unstable and mortal creature which is man.”35  
Neither do the activities of labor nor work ensure the ability to make a home for 
human beings, because both of them do not have the thing-character that permits 
durability, stability and relative independence from men, who are in continuous flux into 
and from the world. What ensures relative stability and the making of a home is rather the 
activity of work.
36
 Labor ensures the mere biological existence of human beings and it is 
caught in the never-ending biological cycles, which begins with birth and ends with 
death. In other words, labor is like the motor power that ensures our continuous living so 
we can perform other activities that distinguish us from nature. 
Arendt explains that “the word ‘life’…follows a strictly linear movement whose 
very motion …is driven by the motor of biological life which man shares with other 
living things and which forever retains the cyclical movement of nature.”37 She also adds 
that “the biological process in man…is part of the cyclical movement of nature and 
therefore endlessly repetitive; all human activities which arise out of the necessity to cope 
with them are bound to the recurring cycles of nature and have in themselves no 
beginning and no end.”38 
Arendt argues that founding a body-politic, which is mainly achieved via people 
acting together, is not possible until people get themselves out of the state of nature 
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towards the state of culture.
39
 Hence, human beings could not jump directly from 
labor/the state of nature/the mere life into action/founding a body-politic. They should 
first separate themselves from nature by making their home out of the artifacts of their 
hands, i.e. making the world. Action could not take place until there is a human habitat 
that functions as its scene and medium. On the other hand, the thing-character of the 
world and the durability of the things that human beings make by their hand is the source 
or the basis of the objectivity of the world against the subjectivity of the makers. Arendt 
illustrates the difference between the objectivity of the world and the eternal movement 
of nature as follows: 
Against the subjectivity of men stands the objectivity of the man-made world 
rather than the sublime indifference of the untouched nature, whose 
overwhelming elementary force, on the contrary, will compel them to swing 
relentlessly in the circle of their own biological movement…only we who have 
erected the objectivity of a world of our own from what nature gives us, who have 
built it into the environment of nature so that we are protected from her, can look 
upon  nature as something “objective” without a world between man and nature, 
there is eternal movement, but not objectivity.
40
 
 
The world, which is durable, objective, and relatively stable, serves a double function: 
getting human beings out of the cyclical natural life and providing a medium for actions 
to be laid over its relative stability: “this web [the fragile web of human relationships] 
overlays the tangible objects of public world with a multiplicity of interpretations 
emanating from different agents.”41  
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II. A. 4. Natality and Mortality 
The three human conditions, which render life on earth possible for human existence: 
life, world and plurality, are further rooted in a more existential fundamental level, which 
is the condition of both natality and mortality. Arendt states that “all activities and their 
corresponding conditions are connected with the most general condition of human 
existence: birth and death, natality and mortality.”42 Both natality and mortality are two 
dimensions and conditions of human existence. 
Arendt, in her analysis of the relation between philosophy and politics, claims that 
philosophers usually emphasize the dimension of mortality over the dimension of 
natality. They do not even give attention to the fact that we are natals as much as we are 
mortals; i.e. we can be defined as natal beings as we are defined as mortal beings as 
well.
43
 Also, the fact of death is overvalued in philosophy over the fact of birth, in 
Arendt’s estimation. This attitude of philosophers towards life and death, which is an 
attitude of ignoring birth and liking death, started with Plato’s Phaedo, where he decides 
that “the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for 
dying and death.”44 Arendt comments on the philosopher’s attitude towards dying by 
saying that “death, being the separation of body and soul, is welcome to him; he is 
somehow in love with death, because the body, with all its demands, constantly interrupts 
the soul’s pursuits.”45 Because of this stance of philosophers, generally, Arendt remarks 
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that “the true philosopher does not accept the conditions under which life has been given 
to man.”46 In other words, Arendt wants to say that the philosopher does not accept the 
condition of natality; and hence, he values death over life.  
The tradition of valuing death over life or not accepting all human conditions of 
existence, which started with Plato, and never stopped in the philosophical tradition, was 
not challenged until Arendt came up with the notion of natality as a no less important 
category than the category of mortality. She theorizes it as the more important ontological 
category of labor, work and action. She said: 
labor and work, as well as, action, are also rooted in natality in so far as they have 
the task to provide and preserve the world for, to foresee and reckon with, the 
constant influx of newcomers who are born into the world as stranger.
47
 
 
According to Arendt, the most important activity that is connected to natality is the 
activity of action because, as we will see later, she equates action with beginning, which 
is rooted in the human condition of natality. In the following passage of Arendt, she will 
not only clarify how the category of natality is the central category of the political action, 
but also she will decide on the essential difference between political and metaphysical 
thought. She states that: 
Action has the closest connection with the human condition of natality; the new 
beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the 
newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting. 
In this sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore of natality is 
inherent in all human activities. Moreover, since action is the political activity par 
excellence, natality, and not mortality, may be the central category of the political 
as distinguished form metaphysical, thought.
48
 
                                                 
46
 Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, 22. 
47
 Arendt, The Human Condition, 9.  
48
 Ibid.  
25 
 
 
 
 
Natality and mortality means, in another way, that we are just visitors on the earth. We 
are born and become caught up in the cyclical biological processes of life that ensures our 
continuous existence. Then, if we do not do anything that transcend this necessary and 
natural cycle, we will live and die like animals.
49
 We will leave the universe with no trace 
behind us that tells we have lived before on earth. We will disappear without a proof of 
our Dasein, of being-there at a particular space and time. This reflection upon the 
condition of natality and mortality, of being mere visitors on the earth, is very 
frightening. Even if we find salvation in religion and do good deeds as religions always 
prescribe to their followers, how can these good deeds be ascribed to its doers, so that 
they can be remembered? How can they be saved from the “natural ruin of time”50 and be 
saved from its fleeting character? Is there any possibility for a mortal being to became, 
even relatively, an immortal being?  
 
II. A. 5. Immortality and the Common 
Human beings in ancient times seemed aware of the apparent fact that they were the only 
mortals in an immortal and everlasting universe. We “move along rectilinear line in a 
universe where everything…moves in a cyclical order.”51 The awareness of the fact that 
the life of an individual is a linear path between birth and death became overwhelming 
very early. The question of how can the existence of mortal human beings, not as species, 
but as distinct individuals, be transformed into immortal existence, became very 
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concerning. How can mortals be immortals who can endure in time and enjoy deathless 
life?
52
 
The Greek’s solution to this human concern is the Aristotelian remark that there is 
a “possibility for immortalizing” for the realm of human affairs.53 He argues in his Ethics 
that “…one should not follow those who advise us to think human thoughts since we are 
human, and mortal thoughts, since we are mortal, but as far as possible one ought to be 
immortal…”54 Arendt adds that the insistence on immortality occurs very often in 
Aristotle’s political writings.55 The possibility of immortality and of creating lasting and 
enduring existence, which saves the human existence from its futility, would be the 
existential spring and the motivation for creating the common or the public realm where 
people can constitute reality to their existence. They can give their futile and originally 
mortal existence an immortal dimension by appearing as actors whose words can be 
heard and whose deeds can be seen. They can also exhibit the artifacts they made and 
they can be known as the makers of beautiful and useful things that could potentially last 
after they have died.  
Therefore, we can conclude with Arendt that, immortality is the center and the 
spring of Vita Activa.
56
 We can understand from her implications that “without this 
transcendence into a potential earthly immortality, no politics, strictly speaking, no 
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common world and no public realm, is possible.”57 According to the private and the 
public domains of Vita Activa, Arendt clarifies that the term “public” signifies two related 
yet not identical phenomena. The first meaning of the public is almost identical with the 
meaning of appearance and reality. Arendt defines it as “everything that appears in public 
[that] can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity. For us, 
appearance…constitutes reality.”58 The second meaning is almost identical to the 
meaning of the world that is constituted from our fabrication and the human affairs 
altogether. She defines it as follows:  
The term ‘public’ signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us 
and distinguished from our privately own place in it. This world, however, is not 
identical with the earth or with nature, as the limited space for the movement of 
men and the general condition of organic life, it is related, rather, to the human 
artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as, to affairs which go on among 
those who inhabit the man-made world together.
59
 
 
Having explained the ontological roots of Vita Activa and the existential origin of the 
common, I shall explain how the human condition of plurality could be manifested in a 
public realm, in order for action to take place. In other words, how can a plurality of 
people exist in the public realm, so that they can act together in an organized way? I 
shall, as well, clarify how action and the human condition of plurality are inherent only in 
freedom. 
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II. B. The Political, Action and Freedom 
It would be very difficult to discuss separately the three categories of the political, the 
action, and freedom, because none of them could exist without the other. Arendt argues 
that action and freedom are the only main constituents of the concept of the political. The 
reason for the very existence of the body-politic is freedom; and freedom in turn has its 
realization in action. Arendt maintains that “the raison d’être of politics is freedom, and 
its field of experience is action.”60 Therefore, Arendt, like the Ancient Greeks, has a very 
definite and relatively narrow meaning of the political. From the three cardinal human 
activities –labor, work and action– action alone is what counts as a political activity. 
Action in turn is the only human activity characterized by freedom. Arendt claims that 
“freedom…is actually the reason that men live together in political organization at all. 
Without it, political life as such would be meaningless.”61 Consequently, in the coming 
discussion, one should bear in mind that the Arendtian concept of politics takes its 
connotations from the Ancient Greek experience, which has almost the inverted meaning 
of what we take to be the political in modern times.
62
  
 
II. B. 1. The Human Condition of Plurality and the Public Realm 
Action is determined by the human condition of plurality. No human being could act 
alone, as Arendt clarifies. She states that “action… is never possible in solitude or 
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isolation; one man alone needs, at the very least, the help of others to carry through 
whatever his enterprise may be.”63 For action to take place, agents should act in the 
“public realm,” which is an organized space for human interaction to take place. Arendt 
stresses that although the other two human conditions, life and world, have some relation 
to politics, the human condition of “plurality is specifically the condition –not only the 
conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam—of all political life.”64 
Not every human community secures a public realm for action and freedom. 
Hence, not every community counts as a body-politic, and not every human community 
knows that the concept of the political is associated solely with freedom. For example, 
tribes and dynasties are not politically organized communities; thus, although they are 
communities, they do not count for body-politic. The principle of the formation of tribes 
and dynasties is mainly labor, the need to preserve life and its necessities. Arendt 
explains that “where men live together but do not form a body-politic,… the factors 
ruling their actions and conduct are not freedom but the necessities of life and concern of 
its preservation.”65 Interaction between its members does not count for action and thus for 
freedom because these communities do not organize public space in which freedom could 
have an appearance. In other words, if a collective of human beings needs to preserve its 
life and existence only, there will be no need for founding a body-politic.  
The Greek polis, which came into existence before the Socratic school of 
philosophy was born, is an exemplar for a body-politic that is built upon and is organized 
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according to the principles of freedom and the public realm. As the human activities of 
labor, work and action were differentiated and distinguished in the Greek polis, the 
location of these activities was demarcated as well. Life was divided into the household 
and the polis, or the private and the public realms.
66
 All activities of labor were taken care 
of in the household or the private realm; and all activities of Action took place in the 
polis or the public realm. Therefore, a Greek citizen had to traverse the sharp distinction 
between the public and the private realms every day. Arendt asserts this division and 
distinction because it is decisive in understanding the Greek conception of freedom and 
politics. She elaborates:  
At the root of Greek political consciousness we find an unequalled clarity and 
articulateness in drawing this distinction. No activity that served only the purpose 
of making a living, of sustaining only the life process, was permitted to enter the 
political realm, and this at the grave risk of abandoning trade and manufacture to 
the industriousness of slaves and foreigners.
67
  
 
Hence, freedom, solely, is the only justification for founding a polis and creating a public 
realm sterile from the activities of labor and work and devoted to human-to-human 
interaction. Arendt points out that this very character of the polis, being founded 
according to the principle of freedom, was reflected in the political philosophies of Plato 
and Aristotle, even though the description of both of these suggests that the borderline 
between the household and the polis was infrequently blurred. For instance, Plato “began 
to draw his examples and illustrations for the polis from everyday experiences in private 
life.”68 On the other hand, Aristotle “tentatively assumes that at least the historical origin 
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of the polis must be connected with the necessities of life and that only its content or 
inherit aim (telos) transcends life in the “good life.”69 
The crucial differences between the household and the polis, which are 
noteworthy for its inherent relation to the concept of freedom, includes the type of human 
activities performed in each, which I have discussed, and the type of interaction between 
the members of each. In the household, everything is done by a command from the 
master and by the obedience of slaves and women to assure maintaining and sustaining 
necessary needs for the members of the household. In other words, the type of interaction 
in the private realm is rulership or governance whose main principle is command and 
obedience. Rulership gave rise to an inequality and a hierarchy in the household with the 
master/free man at the top and the slave/unfree man at the bottom. Moreover, rulership 
justified using coercion and violence in order to preserve necessities.
70
 Arendt explains 
that “because all human beings are subject to necessity, they are entitled to violence 
toward others; violence is the pre-political act of liberating oneself from the necessity of 
life.”71 Because of rulership, governing by command and obedience, which entails 
violence, the household was by definition not a space for realizing freedom. Human 
interaction in the polis was completely opposed to the one in the household. The main 
principle of interaction was not command and obedience between unequals, but action by 
word and deed between equals. Persuasion by word and deed in the polis pre-empted the 
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coercion of command. The polis was the location where equal citizens realize their 
freedom in action, i.e. in speech and deed, “…to be free meant both not to be subject to 
the necessity of life or to the command of another and not to be in command oneself. It 
meant neither to rule nor to be ruled.”72 
The household and the polis share the similarity of being conditions and 
requirements of freedom for equal fellows. The household/ private realm liberates the 
free man from the necessities of life; and the polis/the public realm provides him with an 
organized space for the communication and interaction with equal fellow men by words 
and deeds. Arendt argues that:  
… in order to be free, man must have liberated himself from the necessities of 
life.  But the status of freedom did not follow automatically upon the act of 
liberation. Freedom, needed, in addition to liberation, the company of other men 
who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space to meet them-a 
politically organized world, in other words, into which each of the free men could 
insert himself by word and deed.
73
 
 
The way the Greeks organized their space of existence, their body-politic, helps 
us to understand that in the Greek case, freedom is related to how they understood their 
relation to the space they inhabited. Freedom was a state of a body whose ability to move 
should be guaranteed and facilitated, i.e. by protecting it from being enforced by 
command and from being coerced by its own needs of preservation.  Arendt states that 
“freedom was understood to be the free man’s status, which enabled him to move, to get 
away from home, to go out into the world and meet other people in deed and word.”74 It 
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is also obvious that freedom is not possible for everyone in the polis. The freedom of 
some, the slaves and women, is sacrificed for the freedom of others, the freemen or the 
citizens in the Greek conception.  
 
II. B. 2. Action and Freedom  
Action is the field of the experience of freedom, as Arendt proves. For a freeman to 
realize his freedom, he should be an agent among other equal and distinct agents. Action 
has two modes or two forms in the Greek polis: deeds (acts) or words (speech). Action 
has no end. Nevertheless, it has a result in the form of a story that could be narrated and 
remembered. Ultimately, the story is weaved in history, the storybook of the human 
mankind. Although action has no thing-character for action does not end in an ultimate 
end product as work does, it certainly has an inter-subjective or “subjective in-between”75 
reality that has an appearance insofar as the words are heard and the deeds are seen. 
Consequently, freedom, because it is no more than the ability to act, would have both an 
appearance and a reality.
76
 Arendt clarifies that “the subjective in-between is not tangible 
… but … this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in 
common.”77 
Arendt argues that no form of communication needs speech more than action. 
Every other human interaction could be mediated with a minimum of language; even sign 
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language could suffice to get labor or work done.
78
 On the other hand, speech is 
indispensable for action, not to mention that speech itself is already an action. Most 
conspicuously, “finding [and uttering] the right word at the right moment, quite apart 
from the information or communication they may convey, is action.”79 Therefore, in the 
Greek polis, speech and action were conceived as “coeval and equal, of the same rank 
and the same kind.”80 Beside the inherent character of action in speech, acting together 
would not be possible without self-disclosure. Speech lets us know who we are and lets 
other fellows know who we are. Without disclosing ourselves and answering the question 
“who we are,” we would not be able to act together because action happens in-between 
distinct disclosed agents who have appearances.
81
 Even though agents in the public realm 
are equal, they are distinct and different and “…speech corresponds to the fact of 
distinctness and is the actualization of the human condition of plurality, that is, of living 
as a distinct and unique being among equals.”82 
If speech is correlated with the human condition of distinct plurality, action is 
correlated with the human condition of natality.
83
 Arendt considers natality, not mortality, 
as “the central category of the political.”84 As natals, newcomers born into the world, 
they need to disclose who they are and insert themselves in the world by word and deed. 
Arendt calls the agent’s insertion into the world a second birth.85 What is common 
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between biological and political birth is the fact of beginning. Birth, by definition, is a 
beginning, whether it’s a beginning in nature (the biological) or a beginning in the world 
(the political). This is what Arendt concludes from the etymological analysis of the Greek 
language, which she takes as self-interpreting for the practical political experiences of the 
Greeks.  
According to Arendt, there were two different, but inter-related, words for “to 
act” in the Greek language: archein and prattein. Archein means “to begin,” “to lead,” 
and eventually “to rule,” while prattein means “to pass through,” “to achieve,” “to 
finish.” In Latin, these words were rendered respectively as “agere,” which means to set 
something in motion, and “gerere,” which means the enduring and supporting 
continuation of past acts.
 86
 The twofold meaning of “to act” as related to politics was 
interpreted by Arendt in the following passage:  
In both instances, action occurs in two different stages; the first stage is a 
beginning by which something new comes into the world. The Greek word… 
which covers beginning, leading, ruling, that is, the outstanding qualities of the 
free man, bears witness to an experience in which being free and the capacity to 
begin something new coincided. Freedom, as we would say today, was 
experienced in spontaneity. The manifold meaning …indicates the following: 
only those could begin something new who were already rulers (i.e. household 
heads who ruled over slaves and family) and had thus liberated themselves from 
the necessities of life for enterprises in distant lands or citizenship in the polis; in 
either case, they no longer ruled, but were rulers among rulers, moving among 
their peers, whose help they enlisted as leaders in order to begin something new, 
to start a new enterprise; for only with the help of others could the…. ruler, 
beginner and leader, really act,… carry through whatever he had started to do.87 
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The achievement or the finishing, indicated by the second meaning of the word, is by no 
means an end product or a thing. The action has no end, but it is an end in itself.
88
 Having 
no end, action, by definition, is fleeting in character.
89
 Speech and deeds could fly away 
with no proof that they had existed sometime in the past. The fleeting character of action 
requires the constant presence of others, the witnesses, who would testify, recognize and 
then narrate the story of the great deeds and words.
90
  Story preserves actions from losing 
their reality, and bears witness that, one day, they happened and were heard in words and 
seen in deeds.  
Unprecedented actions would give rise to unprecedented happenings, to events 
which challenge all expectations based on causality and present themselves in the guise 
of miracle.
91
 Being able to act, to begin, to cause something new to happen that was 
unprecedented before, to challenge the laws of causality and to begin a causality of ones’ 
own is Freedom. Thus, freedom in its political origin was mainly constituted in the I-
can.
92
 In the ability to utter words and to perform deeds, this might give rise to an event 
and would deserve to be told in a story. Freedom is constituted in the ability of the Agent. 
If I can, I am free; if I cannot, I am not free. Arendt asserts that: 
…this is the realm [public realm] where freedom is a worldly reality, tangible in 
words which can be heard, in deeds which can be seen, and in events which are 
talked about, remembered and turned into stories before they are finally 
incorporated into the great story book of human history.
93
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In addition, Arendt believes that unpredictability is an inherent character in action; hence, 
the actor should free himself from intentions and motivations as well as from aims and 
consequences; otherwise, he would be implementing a plan, which has an end (his aim) 
and he will not be acting with others, but he will be using them as means for his end. 
Kohn comments on this insight by saying that “if we knew what we were doing when we 
act we would not be free but enacting or unfolding a plan.”94 
 
II. C. Time and the Faculty of Choice  
Arendt has a strong argument that “freedom as related to politics is not a phenomenon of 
the will.”95 Greeks did not discover the faculty of the Will that we usually conceive, in 
the modern age, as a spring of action.
96
 Action was not subjective in the Greek 
experience, but inter-subjective, represented in words and acts that networked the agents 
together. The point that might be perplexing here, as pointed out by Arendt, is that the 
Greeks experienced voluntary and involuntary acts as well as intended and unintended 
acts. She asks the question in this form: “How Greek philosophy dealt with phenomena 
and data of human experience that our post-classical ‘conventions’ have been accustomed 
to ascribe to the will as the mainspring of action?”97 Arendt, then, turned to Aristotle 
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because he recognized “the lacuna in Greek language and thought regarding the faculty 
of will” as no word existed for the faculty of Will.98 
Arendt explains that volition is different from willing. Willing is directed towards 
the future, and thus towards projects that have not yet existed. However, volition occurs 
between two or more existing objects at hand.
99
 The faculty that makes volition possible 
is a faculty of choice, not a faculty of willing. It is practical reason or proairesis, as 
Aristotle conceptualized.
100
 
The faculty of Choice is mainly concerned with means, not with ends, since the 
end is already designated. For the Greeks, the end of the Agent was eudaimonia or 
happiness, which no one directly chooses, but rather pursues through chosen means. 
Arendt interprets the question of ends and choice by the Greeks as follows: “Nobody 
deliberates and chooses health or happiness as his aim, though we may think about them; 
ends are inherent in human nature and the same for all.”101 The faculty of choice “decides 
between things equally possible and given to us, as it were, in statu nascendi as mere 
potentialities.”102 Choice has no capacity to create a new possibility; it is a mere arbiter 
between several possibilities.
103
 
The reason Arendt refers to for which the Greeks did not discover the faculty of 
Will is their concept of time. Will is an organ of the future; and future is plausible only if 
the time is conceived as a rectilinear line that has a definite beginning and a definite end. 
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The Greeks did not have such a concept of time because they conceived the universe as 
immortal having neither a beginning nor an end. The mathematical form which has no 
beginning and no end is the circle. Therefore, their time concept was cyclical. Moreover, 
Arendt argues that the emergence of the cyclical time concept was inevitable on the 
background of discovering an everlasting being, birthless and deathless.
104
 Everything for 
the Greeks was revolving, happening again and again in a circular manner. Even “Events 
and doxai ás, they occur among men, revolve not only once or a few times but infinitely 
often.”105 
In fact, the Aristotelian categories of potentiality and actuality are good 
representatives of the cyclical time concept. The potential exists in a dormant form, 
which needs a cause to bring it into being. Potentiality is one of the causes of everything 
real and the future is always a consequence of the past, as Arendt notes.
106
 In the frame of 
the cyclical time concept, nothing completely new would be introduced into the world. 
To recapitulate, Arendt argues that the political freedom was experienced in the 
Greek polis as an objective quality of the body and an inter-subjective reality in the polis 
of which the recognized chief units are the equal citizens.
107
 Freedom has both an 
appearance and a reality in the body-politic or the polis; however, it was not a 
manifestation of the faculty of Will, for the Greeks did not discover such a faculty. 
Freedom, in the polis, was an experience associated with the ability to act with other 
equal fellows. In other words, freedom was a phenomenon of the I-can, not the I-will. 
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III PHILOSOPHICAL FREEDOM 
III. A. The Concept of Time and the Concept of Inner Life 
Arendt insists that the human mind could acquire and develop new faculties throughout 
the course of history.
108
 She dates the discovery of the faculty of the Will to the human 
experience of religious conversion, specifically the conversion of Paul in the first century 
A.D. as well as the rise of “popular philosophy” by which she refers to Stoicism and the 
related doctrines. Both Christianity and Stoicism led eventually to the discovery of an 
inner life of man, where he could experience an internal freedom in solitude. That is, an 
experience of freedom whose existence is testified only by the one who experiences it.  
Christianity, on the other hand, reversed the relation between man and the world. 
The world is no longer everlasting and immortal. Man, as well, is no longer a mortal 
being whose life is transient in the world as the Ancient Greek world-view suggested.
109
 
In Christianity, the relation is reversed and an authentic future could be hoped for or 
feared from “you who have believed that men die but that the world is everlasting need 
only turnabout, to a faith that the world comes to an end but that you yourself will have 
an everlasting life.”110 Because of this inversion, an inner life for man was possible and 
the question of faith, rightness and struggle to master the inner life became relevant.  
A new concept of time, entailed in the new Christian world-view is a second 
decisive factor that contributes to the discovery of the faculty of will. Elisabeth Young-
Bruehl agrees also on the decisiveness of the concept of time for the discovery of the 
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Will. She explains that “the lack of a notion of will among the Greeks and the 
achievement of such a notion among the Christians were tied to time concepts.”111  
According to the Christian world-view, the universe is created; hence, it has an 
absolute beginning. The universe will come to an absolute definite end as well. Since the 
mathematical form that has a beginning and an end is the line, the new concept of time 
that corresponds to a view of the World, with a beginning and an end, is the rectilinear 
time concept. Therefore, the ancient cyclical concept of time that was congruous with the 
circular movement of life and nature could be preempted with the rectilinear time 
concept. Not only the creed or the faith of creation determines a beginning and end for 
the world, but also “the story that begins with Adam’s expulsion from Paradise and ends 
with Christ’s death and resurrection is a story of a unique, unrepeatable event.”112 
Arendt notices that the story’s events could not be repeated again and again in a 
circular manner: “the story’s sequence presupposes a rectilinear time concept; it has a 
definite beginning, a turning point -the year one of our calendar- and a definite end.”113 
The concept of future and the possible events that might come with it changes 
accordingly from an inauthentic event that already existed in the past in the status of 
potentiality (using the circular time concept) to an authentic tense, which brings about 
events that have never existed in the past (using the rectilinear time concept). Such new 
concept of time hardly touched the secular events in the medieval period, as Arendt 
observes.
114
 Nevertheless, it was indispensable for the discovery of the faculty of will for 
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the Will is “our mental organ for the future.”115 Indeed, without the possibility of 
authentic future that could carry noble events, there would be no need for a faculty of 
Will. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl also observes this relation by stating that: 
…when thinkers emphasize the past within the context of a cyclical time theory -
that is, when future is seen as an actualization or consequence of the past- no 
mental “organ” for the future, no Will, is posited; but, on the other hand, when 
they emphasize the future within the context of a rectilinear time theory-that is, 
when unique events are brought to be possible- an “organ” for the future is 
considered essential.
116
 
 
Given the new possibility of an internal life and the new possibility of a genuine future 
that could be a harbinger of novel events, a new experience of freedom ascribed to the 
Will was possible: the freedom of the Will, or philosophical freedom.
117
 Neither 
philosophical nor political freedom were born in the philosophical tradition; however, the 
fact that a mental faculty had been discovered and with which freedom could be ascribed 
to, in addition to its being experienced in solitude, made the freedom of the Will eligible 
to be subjected to philosophical speculation. 
Political freedom, on the other hand, was not eligible for philosophical 
investigation, for it is conditioned by plurality. Arendt upholds that the main feature of 
philosophy, in its historical tradition, is its concern with man in his singularity, and not 
his plurality. She argues that: 
It lies in the nature of philosophy to deal with man in the singular, whereas 
politics could not even be conceived of if men did not exist in the plural. Or to put 
it another way: the experiences of the philosopher- insofar as he is a philosopher- 
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are with solitude, while for man- insofar as he is political-solitude is an essential 
but nevertheless marginal experience.
118
 
 
Hence, philosophical freedom as an attempt to exercise freedom in singularity was a hope 
of redemption for people, who were exempted from the elite class of citizens. Freedom in 
plurality was not guaranteed for everyone, and is, as well, conditioned by the consent of 
the multitude to grant and secure the freedom of the movement of the body. 
 
III. B. The Discovery of the Will  
Since the discovery of the Will is datable, Arendt’s method in tackling the faculty of Will 
is historical.
 119
 Arendt dates the discovery of the Will to the Apostle Paul. She states that 
“the Will and its necessary Freedom in all their complexity were first discovered by 
Paul.”120 Concomitant with Paul’s conversion and preaching on behalf of Christianity, 
Epictetus, who was a freed slave, was also able to discover the Will and its capacities 
through a rather different experience with Stoicism. 
After Paul and Epictetus raised the complexities of the Will, Augustine, the first 
philosopher of the Will, as Arendt labels him, attempted to solve the problems of the Will 
by transforming it into love. Eight centuries later, in the Middle Ages, Aquinas and Duns 
Scotus were interested in contending over the problems of the Will, not in isolation, but 
in its relation to the intellect. These contentions were the exact problem of free will, 
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which Arendt affirms. She elaborates that we should not be mistaken by the synonymous 
discussions in relation to the problem of freedom, in the political sense.  
Arendt abstracts two general historical human experiences that brought about the 
Will and its alleged freedom. The first, is the human experience in demand of voluntary 
submission to the Divine law; i.e. obedience vs. disobedience to the Divine law in 
theological terms. Arendt extrapolates this fundamental statement as follows: 
…it was the experience of an imperative demanding voluntary submission that led 
to the discovery of the Will, and inherent in this experience was the wondrous fact 
of a freedom that none of the ancient peoples-Greek, Roman, or Hebrew- had 
been aware of, namely, that there is a faculty in man by virtue of which, 
regardless of necessity and compulsion, he can say “Yes” or “No,” agree or 
disagree with what is factually given, including his own self and his existences, 
and that this faculty may determine what he is going to do.
121
 
 
And the second experience is the experience whereby freedom becomes a problem; i.e. 
“when men begin to doubt the coincidence of the Thou-shalt and the I-can…the question 
arises: Are things that concern only me within my power.”122 Both of these experiences 
are manifested in the experience of Apostle Paul. 
 
III. B. 1. Paul and Epictetus   
Paul noticed that law is hard to fulfill. Thus, while there is a will to fulfill the law, the real 
ability of the agent for fulfilment is diminished.
123
 In other words, there is an “I cannot” 
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regarding the commands of law even if the agent has the “I will.” In addition, the 
voluntary submission required by the law from its followers implies that there is a 
possibility of refusal to voluntary submission to the law, i.e. the will might will (submit 
voluntarily to the law) or might nill (refuse to submit to the law). Arendt explains that 
Paul discovered the two-in-one that Socrates had discovered previously.
124
 However, 
while the Socratic two-in-one is in friendship and is indispensable for a solitary dialogue 
or thinking, the two-in-one of Paul is problematic, because the split between the mental 
willing and the real ability would incite a conflict between the I-will and the I-can, or the 
I-will and the I-nill.  
Paul does not see any possible solution to the conflict within the range of human 
capacity, “so that even if the law is obeyed and fulfilled, there remains this inner 
resistance.”125 Only divine grace can resolve the conflict and give peace to the Will. 
Hence, for Paul, the Will is utterly impotent “because it hinders itself”126 and it requires 
divine salvation. 
Concomitantly, Epictetus’s philosophy was interested in making the freedom of 
the slave possible. How could one be a slave in the world and still feel free? It seems also 
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that Epictetus was not troubled with the conflict of the demand of the submission to law, 
but he was more concerned with the problem of inability in the outer world.
127
  
Epictetus discovered that the mind could retain outward “impressions”; and, thus, 
it could deal with the outside things as mere data of consciousness.
128
 For him, man has 
no power over the outward world; yet, he is gifted with mental capacities that enable him 
to represent the outward world in his own inwardness. This implies that man is able to 
rule over himself and over what concerns him only.
129
 Epictetus continues to argue, as 
Arendt explains, that reason teaches the will what is within the limit of will’s power and 
what is outside of its power. Accordingly, the Will has the sovereign decision to 
command itself to do only that which is within the scope of its power. It restricts itself to 
exercise its sovereignty in inwardness only. When the will is entirely capable of 
mastering and ruling the inwardness state, man will be indifferent and invulnerable to the 
outside circumstances and miseries. 
The status of limiting oneself to live in inwardness and to withdraw from the 
outside world demands continuous training. This is for two reasons: first, “man lives his 
ordinary life in the world as it is,” and second, “his inside itself is located within some 
outside, a body that is not in his power but belongs to outside things.”130 Nonetheless, 
despite the hardness of keeping this training in the face of the miseries of the outside 
reality and the vulnerability of the human body, the man, who succeeds in training his 
will to “will what happens anyhow” and to “will what is” and “thus never be at odds with 
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outward things,”131 would achieve the status of invulnerability or atarxia. While Paul 
concludes from his experience that the will is impotent, Epictetus concludes that the will 
is omnipotent for its sovereignty over itself, because nothing could hinder the Will other 
than itself and its capability to bracket reality. 
 
III. B. 2. Unifying the Will 
Augustine, the first philosopher of the Will, went beyond Apostle Paul and Epictetus. In 
Arendt’s analysis of Augustine’s philosophy, she explains his claim in which he states 
that the Will might will and might find no obstacle to realize its willing. Nevertheless, it 
still might not be able to perform. “It is possible to will and, in the absence of any outside 
hindrance still be unable to perform!”132 Thus, Augustine is critical of Stoicism.  He 
noticed that saying no to reality was not enough for tranquility.
133
 He also remarked that 
the willed submissiveness regarding the Divine law presupposes a severe limitation on 
the willing capacity itself. Even the creed of belief in “creation” exerts more limitation on 
the willing capacity. In fact, “no created being can will against creation, for this would be 
a will directed not only against a counter-will, but also against the very existence of the 
willing or nilling subject.”134 For this extreme inability of the Will, Augustine is against 
the Will’s omnipotence; and he claims that the Will needs redemption. 
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Augustine demands that “a good man ought to conform his will to the divine will, 
so that he wills what God wills.”135 In addition; he believes, like Paul and Epictetus, that 
the Will is spilt and thus is in conflict with itself. This is attested by the very fact that the 
Will always speaks in imperatives: “Thou shalt will.”136 It is in the nature of the Will to 
command and to demand obedience. It is as well in its nature to be resisted.
137
 Augustine, 
and Paul, seeks resolution to the conflict of the Will, but, Augustine seeks to resolve the 
division by reuniting the divided will and by transforming it into Love.
138
 Although the 
transformation remained mysterious, as Arendt states, she concludes “…he diagnoses the 
ultimate unifying will that eventually decides a man’s conduct as Love.”139 
 
III. B. 3. Who was willing to pay the price?  
Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, who came eight centuries after Augustine, were not 
interested in the Will per se and its own structure as an isolated faculty, but they were 
interested in its relation to the intellect and whether it is of higher rank with respect to the 
intellect.
140
 
Thomas assembled all faculties: Will, Choice, Intellect and Reason in one system.   
Arendt explains that he assembled the four faculties in the following manner: the two 
apprehensive faculties (the Intellect and the Will) and the two appetitive faculties (the 
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Reason and the Choice) work together in harmony in one system and for an ultimate 
universal end. In the pursuit of the universal end “as the intellect has reasoning as its 
subordinate power for dealing with the particulars, the Will has free choice as its 
subservient helper in sorting out appropriate particular means to a universal end.”141 
Despite the fact that both faculties, the Intellect and the Will, pursue the same universal 
end, which is Being (truth and good), the faculty of Intellect, according to Aquinas has 
primacy over the Will, because the intellect’s end is truth and truth compels; yet, it does 
not coerce. On the other hand, the end of the Will is good; and the good does not compel; 
yet, the Will commands and coerces towards doing the good.
142
 
 
III. B. 3. a. Autonomy and Limitation 
Contrary to Aquinas, Duns Scotus decides that the Will is nobler and higher in rank than 
the Intellect for the Will is able to resist “the needs of desire on the one hand, and the 
dictates
143
 of intellect and reason, on the other.”144 Scotus recognizes the Will as an 
independent faculty from the things as they are; and he acknowledges that the only 
limitation of the Will is that “it cannot deny Being all together.”145 Therefore, the Will 
can set limits to reason; however, it cannot limit the power of nature, whether the nature 
of the inner man, his inclinations, or the nature of the exterior circumstances. 
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Despite this limitation, Scotus insists that even in this case, the Will can still 
exercise its omnipotence, by refusing to submit to the coercion of nature or necessity. The 
exercise would be a mental exercise only. Arendt explains this mental freedom in the 
following passage:  
The Will’s autonomy… decisively limits the power of reason…but it does not 
limit the power of nature, be it the nature of the inner man, called ‘inclination,’ or 
that of exterior circumstances. The will is by no means omnipotent in its actual 
effectiveness: its force consists solely in that it cannot be coerced to will. To 
illustrate this mental freedom, Scotus gives the example of a man ‘who hurls 
himself from a high place’…while man is necessarily falling, compelled by the 
law of gravity, he remains free to continue ‘to will to fall,’ and can also of course 
change his mind, in which case he would be unable to undo what he started 
voluntarily and would find himself in the hands of necessity.”146 
 
III. B. 3. b. The Characteristic of the Will 
Arendt cherishes Duns Scotus among all philosophers. She believes that he is the only 
philosopher who is willing to pay the price of contingency for the gift of freedom.
147
 She 
writes “…his quintessential thought-contingency, the price gladly paid for freedom- he 
had neither predecessors nor successors.”148 
Duns Scotus believes that the Will’s main characteristic regarding freedom is that 
its openness to contraries, namely, the Will can will the thing and its opposite at the same 
time. Arendt quotes Scotus: “it is in the power of our will to will and to nill, which are 
contraries, with respect to the same object.”149 Scotus asserts the idea that, as quoted by 
Arendt, “the essential characteristic of our volitional act is … the power to choose 
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between opposite things and to revoke the choice once it has been made.”150 The attribute 
of openness to contraries at the same time is peculiar to the Will. Neither desire nor 
intellect can side with the Will regarding this criterion. Arendt interprets Duns Scotus as 
follows: “An object presented to desire can only attract or repel, and an issue presented to 
the intellect can only be affirmed or negated. But it is the basic quality of our will that we 
may will or nill the object presented by reason or desire.”151  
As a consequence to the ability of the Will to will and nill a particular object at 
the same time, the Will is able to suspend a second volition. The ability of the mind to 
suspend the second volition is the very test of freedom. Arendt affirms that: “[suspension] 
is an important testimony to human freedom, to the mind’s ability to avoid all coercive 
determination from outside.”152 Simply, the Will knows that it could have willed the 
object that it actually nilled with no coercion. Scotus also confirms that “[the willing ego 
knows that] a decision actually taken need not have been taken and a choice other than 
the one actually made might have been made.”153 
 
III. B. 3. c. The Unconditional Bias to Freedom 
Arendt depicts Scotus as a rescuer of human freedom. In every argument freedom is 
endangered because it confronts either the Divine providence or the law of causality. 
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Scotus makes choices and builds arguments to protect freedom. Indeed, his position on 
contingency and the primacy of the Will is for the sake of saving freedom.
154
 
We discussed earlier how Arendt interprets the letters of Paul and the philosophy 
of Augustine as doubting the human competency, and hence, seeking the Divine 
redemption to the split will. Scotus, unlike Paul and Augustine, finds no need for the 
Divine interference to redeem the split will. Scotus admits that all of man’s natural 
capabilities “follow the laws laid down by divine Fiat.”155 Therefore, he neither sees 
contradiction between free will and nature, because man is part and parcel of nature; nor 
does he see contradiction between free will and the Divine providence, because man was 
created in God’s image.156 
For Scotus, Will cannot nill the Being altogether as stated before. Thus, freedom 
of the Will is limited. Nevertheless, the Will still has the capacity to freely affirm, negate, 
love or hate whatever confronts it
 
 without being coerced by any cause of coercion,
 157
 
whether it was an outside coercion or it was the coercion of another inside mental faculty, 
namely: desire or reasoning.
158
 
Freedom in Scotus has a limitation and a capacity: a limitation of a man who is 
created and subjected to God’s Will, and a capacity to have unconditional position from 
being. In other words, to love a being is a position, to hate a being is a position, and to 
deny or to accept a being is a position. All these positions are taken freely. According to 
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Scotus, as Arendt interprets him, nothing could coerce the Will to take a particular 
position; even if there is an external coercion, the Will still could not be coerced! 
 
III. B. 3. d. Causality and Contingency 
Free will was problematic, not only because of its apparent contradiction with the Divine 
providence, but also because of the law of causality. Arendt explains that “theoretically, 
the trouble has always been that Free Will… seems utterly incompatible, not just with 
divine providence, but with the law of causality.”159 She adds that Scotus knew the law of 
causality in its Aristotelian version as “a chain of causation that would make movement 
intelligible and ultimately lead to an unmoved source of all motions, the unmoved mover, 
a cause that itself is not caused.”160 
Scotus accepts Aristotle’s law of causality; nevertheless, he accepts it not 
uncritically because if he accepted the law of causality as it is, freedom would be at stake. 
Scotus, on the other hand, did not reject the law of causality, neither did he refute it. 
However, he developed the theory of causality and modified it into a theory that can 
accommodate or rather explain freedom. 
Arendt claims that Scotus began his discussion by asking the question “whether 
the act of the will is caused in the will by the object moving it or by the will moving 
itself.”161 In fact, he rejects both answers. To explain, he rejects the first one, will is 
moved by object because it is entirely contradicting to his principle on the Will’s 
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autonomy and hence of freedom (or his unconditional commitment to freedom). Scotus, 
as well, rejects the second answer that the Will is moving itself because it contradicts his 
principle of the Will’s limitation. Arendt also adds that if the second answer is accepted, 
there would be consequences to volition, which could not be explained. She did not 
clarify what these consequences are. 
The rejection of both answers led Scotus to adopt a median position and to 
develop a theory called “theory of concurrent-partial causes,” which can save both 
necessity and freedom, as Arendt argues. To explain his theory of concurrent causes, 
another factor should be explained. It is Scotus’s critique of Aristotle’s account of 
causality. 
Scotus noticed that “the strength of the argument, or, rather, its explicatory force, 
lies in the assumption that no more than one cause is sufficient to explain why something 
should be rather than not-be, that is to explain motion and change.”162 Arendt argues that 
Scotus challenges the chain-oriented theory of causality and proposes a theory of 
causality that includes many concurrent causes for a thing to-be. The prime example for 
Scotus is the simple daily fact of reproduction: “two independent substances, male and 
female, must come together to bring forth a child.” As a result, “he reaches the theory 
that all change occurs because a plurality of causes happens to coincide, and the 
coincidence engenders the texture of reality in human affairs.”163 
As a matter of fact, the theory of partial-concurrent causes proved that the very 
phenomenon, change and motion, that led Aristotle to the law of causality, also led 
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Scotus to the notion that change and motion are ruled by contingency.
164
 His theory led 
him even to a different concept of contingency than that of Aristotle. Scotus prefers to 
say that something is caused contingently rather than saying that something is contingent. 
Arendt quotes Scotus: 
by contingent, said Scotus, “I do not mean something that is not necessary or 
which was not always in existence, but something whose opposite could have 
occurred at the time that this actually did. That is why I do not say that something 
is contingent, but that something is caused contingently.
165
 (Italics added) 
 
Arendt explains Scotus in her own words by saying that “it is precisely the causative 
element in human affairs that condemns them to contingency and unpredictability.” She 
praises Scotus for his quite challenging position on the notion of contingency itself. 
Scotus was the only thinker, according to Arendt, for “whom the word contingent has no 
derogatory association.” For him, “contingency is a positive mode of Being, just as 
necessary is another mode.”166  He was also quite shocking for his opponents, who were 
in doubt about contingency. He confronts them with this example: “let all those who deny 
contingency be tortured until they admit that it would be possible not to be tortured.”167 
For Scotus’ quite unique position on contingency, Arendt states that “nothing indeed 
could be in greater contradiction to every philosophical tradition than this insistence on 
the contingent character of processes.”168 
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III. C. The Modern Age 
With the rise of modernity, there was more need for an organ for future, since modernity 
obviously emphasized the future and the concept of progress. While medieval 
speculations regarding the Will were still dominant in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
centuries, the discussions following Kant were dramatically different.
 169
  However, 
Arendt skipped Kant because, for him, “the Will is not a special mental capability distinct 
from thinking, but practical reason, a Vernunftwille not unlike Aristotle’s nous 
praktikos.”170 She also continues to justify the absence of the Will as  a mental faculty 
from Kant’s philosophy: “Kant’s Will is neither freedom of choice (liberum arbitrium) 
nor its own cause; for Kant, sheer spontaneity, which he often called “absolute 
spontaneity,” exists only in thinking, Kant’s will is delegated by reason to be its 
executive organ in all matters of conduct.”171 
Arendt observes that with the last stage of the modern age: “Will begins to be 
substituted for reason as man’s highest mental faculty.”172 At the turn of the Nineteenth 
Century, “it became fashionable to equate Willing and Being.” For this reason, Arendt 
proposes that for the philosophers of German Idealism, the Will was not a mental faculty, 
but is transformed into an ontological entity.
173
 She states that for Schiller “no power of 
man but his will,” for Schopenhauer “the Kantian thing in itself is the Will,” for 
Schelling, “in the final and highest instance there is no other Being than Will.” This view 
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on Will finally culminated in Hegel.
174
 Due to this transformation of the Will and its 
eventual equation with Being, Arendt exempts the philosophers of the Will from her 
historical exposition for she considers the Will a faculty of mind, not an ontological 
entity. She clarified “ [I have] omitted from our considerations that body of thought, 
German Idealism, in which sheer speculation in the realm of metaphysics perhaps 
reached its climax together with its end.”175 
Two modern philosophers were still relevant to her objectives: Nietzsche and 
Heidegger. Nietzsche, who refuted the theory of the freedom of the Will for the last time, 
was depicted by Arendt as a convert to ancient philosophy whose main inquiry was into 
Being and his thought of eternal return was a conversion to the ancient cyclical concept 
of time which means restricting the Will to willing that whatever happens shall happen 
again and again.
176
 While Nietzsche repudiated the Will, Heidegger broke later with the 
modern philosophy and its belief in progress, and he concluded that the Will should will 
not-to-will.
177
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IV THE RELATION  
Having explained Arendt’s exposition of political and philosophical freedom, I shall turn 
now to the question of: What is the relation between political and philosophical freedom, 
if any? As a matter of fact, Arendt sees no relation between the two types of freedom 
other than the utter opposition of one to the other. I, however, infer three main aspects of 
opposition between the two types: first, the origin or the human experiences that gave 
rise to each one of them; second, the location of both of each; third, the conditions that 
determine the existence or the experience of each one of them. The best description of the 
relation between the two types is that they are completely distinct and differentiated from 
each other. 
 
IV. A. The Three Aspects of Differentiation 
IV. A. 1. The Origin  
 
The basic human experience that gave rise to each one of the two types of freedom is 
completely different in nature. Political freedom originated in the human experience of 
inserting ones’ self in the world by words and deeds. Philosophical freedom, on the 
contrary, originated in the human experience of withdrawing ones’ self from the world 
into the inwardness of one’s self, which no other selves has access to. Hence, political 
freedom would have an appearance in the world, while philosophical freedom would not 
have an appearance. Arendt considers anything that has no appearance in the world as 
unpolitical by definition, such as experiencing one’s own will. 
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According to Arendt, the original freedom is the political freedom. Men, 
originally, lived together in a political community and experienced freedom in their 
mutual interactions. She elaborates that “we first become aware of freedom or its 
opposite in our intercourse with others, not in the intercourse with ourselves.”178 She 
affirms that the experience of inner freedom would not be possible if it were not preceded 
by the experience of political freedom. She states that “man would know nothing of inner 
freedom if he had not first experienced a condition of being free as a worldly tangible 
reality.”179  
The World, which exists because of the human existence, is a decisive factor in 
the human experiences of freedom since the world functions as the scene of human 
action. To be more specific, action does not take place in nature. If man existed in nature, 
he would be reduced to animal laborans. That is, he will be occupied only with satisfying 
his bodily needs and protecting his body from dangers of nature. On the other hand, the 
World, which is conditioned by the human activity of work, is the scene of human action 
since it gives the possibility for human beings to liberate themselves from mere bodily 
needs and to fabricate a world of their own that would be a scene for action; “work… 
corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence.”180  
Political freedom in the Greek experience was conditioned by having a home (or 
private space) in the world. Obviously, this is not guaranteed for everyone. Having one’s 
private space in the world as a condition to be free in the public realm is automatically 
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excluding the one who does not have his own space. This misfortune applies to many 
groups in the polis, such as slaves, women and foreigners. Consequently, how could one 
who is a slave in the world, for instance, experience freedom? This was the burden and 
concern of Epictetus, who was a freed slave. Epictetus, as Arendt depicts, was looking for 
a home in the world, but he did not find one. Thus, he turned inside his own self to find a 
home that is not conditioned by any external conditions. As a consequence, the 
experience of freedom in the outer world was transposed to the inner world. And hence, 
the experience of inner freedom is a derivative in character. “The experiences of inner 
freedom are derivative in that they always presuppose a retreat from the world, where 
freedom was denied, into an inwardness to which no other has access.”181 Not only 
Epictetus transposed the experience itself from outside to inside, he also transformed the 
worldly relations that conditioned freedom into relations within one’s own self.182 In 
other words, as the outer experience of freedom was conditioned by owning a home and 
liberating ones’ self from necessities by ruling and dominating over others, who are not 
free, the experience of inner freedom must be the same. Arendt clarifies this transposing 
experience by stating that: 
Epictetus transposed these worldly relations [having a place in the world and 
having power over others] into relations within man’s own self, whereby he 
discovered that no power is so absolute as that which man yields over himself, 
and that the inward space where man struggles and subdues himself is more 
entirely his own, namely, more securely shielded from outside interference, than 
any worldly home could ever be.
183
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The Experience of Epictetus could be interpreted as an early attempt to break up the 
notion of freedom from the notion of politics for the sake of granting freedom to slaves 
and reach a formulation “through which one may be a slave in the world and still be 
free.”184 
 
IV. A. 2. The Location 
 
Understanding the experiences that gave rise to each one of the two freedoms, it is 
possible to say that a main difference between both of them is the location of each one. In 
other words, one could ask the question “what is the location of freedom?” Experiencing 
freedom in the external world, where freedom would have an appearance and worldly 
relations, is the political freedom; while experiencing freedom in the internal life, where 
freedom hides from the world and lacks an appearance is philosophical freedom. Ilya 
Winham agrees that “to attribute freedom to the (I-will) even if you could not do what 
you will to do, is to separate freedom from movement in the world and thus from action 
(I-can), and to locate it in intercourse with yourself.”185 
Arendt, however, does not ask the question “where is the location of freedom?” 
She rather asks the question “where is the proper location of freedom?”186 As a matter of 
fact, Arendt does not see philosophical freedom as a genuine or a correct from of 
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practicing freedom. Her reason is that the quality of freedom should be the I-can, where it 
manifests in the outer world with other fellows; while philosophical freedom is a quality 
of the I-will, where it is limited only to the inner realm. Arendt’s real concern in posing 
the question in the form of “what is the proper location of freedom?” is to re-marry 
politics and freedom again after they had been divorced for long centuries of 
philosophical speculations centered on the theme of inner freedom or free will.  
Arendt points out that it is only when the location of human freedom is transposed 
from outside into inside, it is possible to incorporate the problem of freedom or the 
question of freedom into the discipline of philosophy. Philosophy did not deal with the 
subject of freedom in the political realm before theology accomplished the job of 
transposing locations. This is for the reason that philosophy deals with human beings in 
singularity only, not in plurality. When freedom was transposed into the inner domain of 
man, it was ready to go under philosophical speculations. Thus, freedom became a 
synonym to free will. As Arendt puts it:  
Only when the early Christians, and especially Paul, discovered a kind of freedom 
which had no relation to politics, could the concept of freedom enter the history of 
philosophy when it was experienced as something occurring in the intercourse 
between men. Free will and freedom became synonymous notions, and the 
presence of freedom was experienced in complete solitude, “where no man might 
hinder the hot contention wherein I had engaged with myself,” the deadly conflict 
which took place in the “inner dwelling” of the soul and the dark “chamber of the 
heart.
187
  
 
And she also reiterates the same idea in the following passage: 
 
…philosophers first began to show an interest in the problem of freedom when 
freedom was no longer experienced in acting and in associating with others but in 
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willing and in the intercourse with one’s self, when, briefly, freedom had become 
free will. Since then, freedom has been a philosophical problem of the first 
order…188  
 
IV. A. 3. The Conditions  
Having explained the differences between the origin and location of both philosophical 
and political freedom, it is likely to recapitulate the conditions of each. Neither occurs 
naturally or automatically, but there are conditions for each one to exist or to be 
experienced. 
Political freedom could not exist in a place other than where men live together in 
a body-politic that is regulated by laws, norms and traditions. Not every body-politic 
secures action-based interactions between its members. Only the body-politic founded 
upon the principle of making action possible in a public realm (where agents can relate to 
each other by words and deeds). This is in addition to the condition of equality between 
its agents (i.e. not allowing the form of ruler-ship among the agents, neither to rule, nor to 
be ruled). Moreover, the intersubjective space and the bodies of agents should be in a 
secure and safe state for interactions, and must not be threatened by fear and insecurity. 
Arendt recapitulates political freedom by stating:  
Political freedom is distinct from philosophical freedom in being clearly a quality 
of the I-can and not of the I-will. Since it is possessed by the citizen rather than by 
man in general, it can manifest itself only in communities, where the many who 
live together have their intercourse both in word and in deed regulated by a great 
number of rapport-laws, customs, habits, and the like.
189
 
 
On the other hand, philosophical freedom is conditioned by isolation and solitude. No 
action in philosophical freedom, but only training is required to exercise ones’ will and 
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master the self-inwardness. Moreover, philosophical freedom (or exercising free will) 
does not need a public space to be experienced nor does it need other fellows and hence it 
needs no recognition. Indeed, nothing could verify or testify free will because it has no 
appearance; it is completely solipsistic. Arendt writes: “Nothing indeed can be more 
frightening than the notion of solipsistic freedom- the “feeling” that me standing apart, 
isolated from everyone else, is due to free will, that nothing and nobody can be held 
responsible for it but me myself.”190 
As a matter of fact, political and philosophical freedoms are limited. The political 
type is limited because of the law or the constitution that includes normative principles 
even if they are human-made; in other words, there is what “ought” to be done. Arendt 
refers to Montesquieu on this matter. As the French thinker says:  
It is true that in democracies the people seem to act as they please; but political 
liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom. In…societies directed by laws, 
liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not 
being constrained to do what we ought not to will.
191
  
 
Similarly, free will is, as well, limited. The Will could not deny Being altogether, as Duns 
Scotus pointed out. Philosophical freedom is also limited by the body’s vulnerabilities.  
And this is how suicide was justified in Stoicism (i.e. when outside circumstances were 
no longer bearable). According to the Stoics, life after death is another form of being, 
exactly as life on earth is a form of being.
192
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The difference between the political and the philosophical freedom has not been 
outlined clearly before Arendt outlined it in “What is Freedom?” and in the Life of the 
Mind/Willing. In our understanding, we tend to think that free will (Philosophical 
freedom) and freedom (political freedom) are synonyms. In fact, Arendt points out that 
only Montesquieu noticed the difference: not because he was interested in the question 
itself, but because he realized that free will, as articulated in his time, did not suffice for 
political and the legal purposes. In the chapter entitled “Of the Liberty of the Subject,” 
Montesquieu explains that “philosophical liberty consists in the free exercise of the will; 
or at least, if we must speak agreeably of our will. Political liberty consists in security, or 
at least in the opinion that we enjoy security.”193 
 
IV. B. The Reversal and the Problem of Sovereignty 
Another aspect that might shed light on the significance of understanding the two types of 
freedom as separate phenomena is to ask the question: what if both types have been 
exercised inter-changeably? What if we attempted to exercise the I-can in the internal 
realm and the I-will in the external realm? Arendt suggests that it is irrelevant to exercise 
the I-can in the inner self because the I-can always expresses itself in the outside and 
always has an appearance. Political freedom consists mainly in action, and since I could 
not act with myself, I could not experience the political freedom in solitude: “action… is 
never possible in solitude or isolation.”194  
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Similarly, philosophical freedom as an attempt to master the inwardness has no 
appearance; therefore, it is politically irrelevant. Arendt argues that “this inner feeling 
remains without outer manifestations and hence is by definition politically irrelevant.”195 
However, the I-will might have the ambition to cross the boundaries of the self 
and to extend itself in the public realm. In this case, if the philosophical freedom is 
applied as such on the political realm, it will lead to endangering and cancelling political 
freedom. To explain, the I-will constitutes itself in giving commands and demanding 
obedience.
196
 The mastering of the internal realm means that one should be sovereign on 
his own self, that is to say, having the supreme authority to command one’s self and 
coerce it to obey.  
Most conspicuously, if the I-will extends itself to the political realm, where others 
also exist, it will exercise the same capacities: the capacity to command and to coerce for 
demanding obedience; ultimately, to be sovereign over others. Exercising philosophical 
freedom as such in the public realm implies hierarchy and presupposes inequality; hence, 
to preclude the possibility of action, action should be between equals. Not to mention that 
the mode of interaction in the command-obedience model is incompatible with the mode 
of interaction in action-based models. The problem of sovereignty is a manifestation of 
the exercise of free will in the public realm. Arendt asserts that: “…as such it was applied 
to the political realm and thus has become a political problem as well. Because of the 
philosophical shift from action to will-power…the ideal of freedom ceased to be 
                                                 
195
 Arendt, “What is Freedom?,” 146. 
196
 As Aquinas pointed out Will commands and coerce while truth compels. Arendt, The Life of the Mind/ 
Willing, 120. 
67 
 
 
 
 
virtuosity…and became sovereignty, the ideal of free will, independent from others and 
eventually prevailing against them.”197 
The faculty that identifies itself in commanding and obeying could not be a 
faculty for freedom, but could only be a faculty for oppression, and therefore something 
anti-political. Arendt explains that “the faculty of will and will-power in and by itself…is 
and essentially nonpolitical and even ant-political.”198 The conflict that is inherent in the 
formulation of I-will and I-nill or the I-will and I-cannot shall be transformed in the 
public realm between numerous wills which, needless to say, would be in continuous 
struggles and conflicts. In this case, the most powerful individual will, will end up taking 
over the public realm and oppressing other wills. The other possibility that Arendt 
explains is when an organized group succeed to reach a consensus in the “general will.” 
Arendt argues that any political theory, which implies equating between free will 
and freedom, leads to either one of two fatal consequences: either to cancel political 
freedom entirely or to grant freedom of the will to one individual or one group at the 
expense of canceling the freedom of others. Arendt elaborates as follows: 
Politically, this identification of freedom with sovereignty is perhaps the most 
pernicious and dangerous consequence of the philosophical equation of freedom 
and free will. For it leads either to a denial of human freedom… or to the insight 
that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic can be purchased only 
at the prices of the freedom, i.e., the sovereignty, of all others.
199
 
 
As philosophical freedom or the free will requires sovereignty, which is obviously 
fatal to political freedom, Arendt adds an additional protective guarantee to political 
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freedom. It is the condition of non-sovereignty. Freedom and sovereignty cannot be 
identical and cannot exist simultaneously. Freedom consists in action while sovereignty 
constitutes in command. While Arendt did not solve the problem of how the condition of 
non-sovereignty could be realized, we can understand how a body-politic based on 
sovereignty turns out to be inimical to freedom. Arendt explains that: 
Where men wish to be sovereign, as individuals or as organized groups, they must 
submit to the oppression of the will, be this, the individual will with which I force 
myself, or the “general will” of an organized group. If men wish to be free, it is 
precisely sovereignty they must renounce.
200
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V THE TRANSFORMATION  
Having explained Arendt’s unique exposition and differentiation between political and 
philosophical freedom, it still seems that the problem of freedom has not been settled. In 
modern times we claim that we are for freedom; simultaneously, we assert that the notion 
of sovereignty is indispensable for keeping the body-politic functioning. The 
contradiction seems left unsettled.  
Not surprisingly, Hannah Arendt did not aim at reconciliation between opposing 
rivals, though she is unconditionally biased towards political freedom. Arendt went back 
to the pre-Socratic Greeks to find refuge in a world where freedom was constituted in 
action, not in willing.
201
 However, she admits that human experiences that led to the 
discovery of the I-will and the human experiences of the philosophical freedom are 
impossible to undo. Philosophical freedom is rooted and integrated in the body of the 
philosophical, the religious and even the political traditions. Arendt explains how the 
philosophical notion of freedom insinuated itself into the principles of the men of action. 
She asserts that: “the philosophical ancestry of our current political notion of freedom is 
still quite manifest in the eighteenth–century political writers, when, for instance, Thomas 
Paine insisted that “to be free it is sufficient [for man] that he wills it,” a word which 
Lafayette applied to the nation-state.”202 
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How could freedom be protected from such an assault of the commanding and 
oppressing faculty? Since it is apparently impossible to undo the experiences of the past, 
I argue that Arendt’s insistence on the notion of beginning as a way of action and a way 
to express one’s freedom is actually an attempt for the transformation of the faculty of the 
Will into a faculty of Beginning. To argue for the thesis of transformation, I shall explain 
how Arendt has been inspired by Augustine and Kant to articulate her notion of 
beginning, which starts off from the mind but ends up in the external world.  
Arendt calls the philosophy of Augustine “a philosophy of natality.” His 
speculations on the creation of Man might have led him to define human beings as natals, 
not as mortals like the Greeks. Augustine’s addresses of the question of “why it was 
necessary to create Man, apart from and above all other living beings,” and he gave a 
rather surprising reply. He argues that “in order that there may be novelty, a beginning 
never before existed, that is, not before Man’s creation.”203 Moreover, he gives much 
more significance to the creation of Man than to the creation of the world. He designates 
two different words for the creation of each: he used the word initium for the creation of 
Man and principium for the creation of heaven and earth. Augustine assumes that other 
creatures were created in numbers, while Man “was created in the singular and continued 
to be ‘propagated from individuals.’”204 The individuality of man, which accompanied 
him from his very beginning, expresses itself in the Will. Thus, Arendt infers from 
Augustine that “every man, being created in the singular, is a new beginning by virtue of 
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his birth.”205 Hence, the beginning, which implies novelty, is the very manifestation of 
the Will. As the creation of man has never been preceded by any similar creature and as 
he himself is a beginning, he is able to initiate beginnings.  
The beginning as a beginning that has not been preceded is one determining 
element of Arendt’s concept of freedom. The other element is spontaneity, which Arendt 
draws obviously from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where he proved that the faculty 
of beginning a series is an act of freedom. Kant explains that: 
…the faculty of beginning a series in time entirely on its own is thereby proved, 
now we are permitted also to allow that in the course of the world different series 
may begin on their own as far as their causality is concerned and to ascribe to the 
substances in those series the faculty of acting from freedom.
206
 [Italics added] 
 
Kant differentiates between the absolute and the relative beginning, which Arendt takes 
to be very similar to Augustine’s differentiation between principium and initium.207 The 
relative beginning is preceded by another state of affairs, but only in time not in causality. 
Kant claims that:  
One should not, however, be stopped here by a misunderstanding, namely, that 
since a successive series in the world can have only a comparatively first 
beginning, because a state of the world must always precede it, perhaps no 
absolutely first beginning of the series is possible during the course of the world. 
For here we are talking of an absolute beginning not as far as time is concerned 
but as far as causality is concerned.
208
 [Italics added] 
 
Nevertheless, Arendt points out that there is something remarkable regarding 
what Kant calls “absolute spontaneity.” That is to say, spontaneity, as Kant argues in the 
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above passage exists only in thinking and not in willing. Therefore, Arendt infers that 
Kant’s Will is not a separate mental faculty, but “a practical reason.” In other words, 
“Kant’s Will is delegated by reason to be its executive organ in all matters of conduct.”209 
Arendt criticizes Kant in the example of the chair, whereby he attempts to 
illustrate what he means by absolute beginning regarding causality, which he considers 
to be the human act of freedom. Kant states that: 
If (for example) I am now entirely free, and get up from my chair without the 
necessarily determining influence of natural causes, then in this occurrence, along 
with its natural consequences to infinity, there begins an absolutely new series, 
even though as far as time is concerned this occurrence is only the continuation of 
a previous series. For this decision and deed do not lie within the succession of 
merely natural effects and are not a mere continuation of them; rather, the 
determining natural causes of that series entirely cease in regard to this 
event…therefore it must be called, not as far as time is concerned but in regard to 
causality, an absolutely first beginning of a series of appearances.
210
 [Italics 
added] 
 
Arendt’s main critique is that this example does not count for a free act because it lacks 
an important element, which is the element of the role of mind in the act. Only when 
there is “something in mind he wishes to do” does this series of events count for freedom 
in Arendt’s account. She objects to Kant by saying: 
…there is something fundamentally wrong with Kant’s example. Only if he, 
arising from his chair, has something in mind he wishes to do, does this ‘event’ 
start a ‘new series’; if this is not the case, if he habitually gets up at this time or if 
he gets up in order to fetch something he needs for his present occupation, this 
event is itself ‘the continuation of a preceding series.’211 
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Therefore, in Arendt’s view, this example would be significant in relation to her concept 
of freedom as spontaneity, as long as it is reinterpreted as an attempt to reconcile “new 
series of acts and states” with the time continuum that this ‘new series’ interrupts.” In her 
critique, Arendt tries to make the interruption of the genuine unprecedented act to the 
time continuum a comprehensible act of freedom. 
VI CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, freedom for Arendt constitutes in bringing something new into 
existence, (i.e. something which has not been existed before). Thus, freedom causes 
events to happen, which appears in the guise of a miracle. And this miracle could not be 
predicted beforehand by any given state of affairs. The choice between two given things 
is not an act of freedom at all, for the two possibilities of choice already exist. Arendt 
asserts that to create something new, we should begin or initiate, and we should act 
together, not for or against others. Using the Kantian concept of spontaneity and the 
Augustinian concept of beginning, the faculty of Will would be no longer a faculty of 
command and coercion, but a faculty of future, of action, and of beginning. 
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